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Appellants Daniel Paslay, Gary Ottman, and Brothers, (the "Landowners"), 
by and through their attorneys of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit 
Appellants' Brief 
I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
For more than half a century, the A&B Irrigation District ("A&B") has exclusively 
delivered surface water' to the Unit A component of A&B, where Landowners own land and have 
applied that surface water to beneficial use. Unit B, which exclusively used ground water, has 
always outnumbered Unit A in geographic area and, consequently, in voting power. In 2014, A&B 
voted to construct new infrastructure to provide surface water to some 1,500 acres of Unit B, where 
surface water had never before been delivered, and to assess all landowners (in Unit A and Unit 
B) for the expense. Thus, where the amount of available surface water is fixed and had been solely 
applied to Unit A for decades, A&B has increased the acreage on which this fixed supply will be 
applied-diluting the limited supply of water and decreasing the supply available to Landowners 
without their consent and without taking their concerns into account. Instead, A&B has asserted 
that Landowners are currently receiving all the water they are due and, on that basis, the District 
Court held that Landowners lacked standing, and that Landowners' claims were unripe and were 
barred by res judicata. 
As used in this brief, "surface water" includes the delivery of water diverted under natural flow water rights 
("natural flow") and water stored in the upper Snake River reservoir system and later released for delivery 
("storage water"). 
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of Proceedings. 
Landowners filed their initiai Complaint on February 1 20i6. Clerk's Record ("R."), p. 
7. Landowners initially made two claims: first, for a "declaratory judgment enforcing the 
[Landowners'] water rights protected by the Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, §§ 1, 3, 4, and 5," R., 
pp. 16-18 ( capitalization modified), and second, for a "declaratory judgment enforcing the 
[Landowners'] property rights protected by the Idaho Constitution, Art. I, §§ 13 and 14." R., pp. 
19-20 ( capitalization modified). Later, Landowners filed their Amended Complaint, which 
asserted a third claim against A&B for "breach of fiduciary duty." R., pp. 246, 259-60. 
On April 4, 2016, A&B' s attorney appeared and filed Defendant's lvfotion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to JR.C.P. 12(B)(6) [sic] together with a supporting memorandum and a 184-page 
Affidavit of Dan Temple in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. R., pp. 35-242. A&B has 
never filed an answer in this case. On April 22, 2016, Landowners "served a copy of Plaintffls · 
First Set of Discovery Requests on [A&B's] attorneys of record." R., p. 321 (italics in original). 
A&B has never provided any discovery responses. 2 
The proceedings on Counts 1 and 2 (from the Complaint) were staggered from the 
proceedings on Count 3 (from the Amended Complaint), however, they followed the same 
procedural course. A&B sought to dismiss each. R., pp. 38-40, 366-68 (the "Afotions to Dismiss"). 
Reacting to each motion to dismiss, Landowners first sought to strike the various affidavits of Dan 
Temple and asked the District Court to deny the Motions to Dismiss under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Landowners agreed with A&B that discovery responses were unnecessary during the pendency of the Motions to 
Dismiss and, given the District Court's Decisions, it was unnecessary to require discovery responses. 
Nevertheless, this dearth of discovery is a significant factor in Landowners' Motions to Continue. 
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Procedure l 2(b )( 6)-pursuant to the Motions to Dismiss had R., pp. 
491-493 (the "Motions to Strike"). If the District Court was determined to consider the matters 
outside the pleadings in this case (i.e., the Complaint and Amended Complaint), Landowners also 
filed alternative motions to continue the proceedings, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(±) (now Rule 56( d)), to obtain facts essential to justify their opposition to the Motions to Dismiss 
or to deny the Motions to Dismiss under the summary judgment standard. R., pp. 281-301, 494-
96 (the "Motions to Continue"). The Motions to Continue were supported by affidavits. R., pp. 
302-20, 439-90; see also R., pp. 286-87, 506-09 (citing the affidavits). 
A&B opposed the Landowners' motions, R., pp. 324-43, 522-36, and also submitted two 
further affidavits from Dan Temple. R., pp. 344-51, 537-39 (together with the prior affidavit of 
Dan Temple, R., pp. 35-242, the "Temple Affidavits"). After Landowners filed reply briefs, R., 
pp. 352-65, 540-56, the hearing occurred on May 9, 2016. R., pp. 3,243. 
On May 16, 2016, the District Court issued its ,~emorandum Decision re: Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, IR.C.P. I 2(b)(6) (the "First Decision"). R., pp. 369-85. Subsequently, 
Landowners filed Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (the "Motion for Reconsideration"), R., 
pp. 393-438, along with the Second Affidavit of Robert L. Harris in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, R., pp. 439-90. The second hearing occurred on June 20, 2016. R., p. 4. 
On July 15, 2016, the District Court issued the Memorandum Decision re: (I) Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Count III, IR.C.P. I 2(b)(6) and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, 
IR.C.P. II (a)(2)(B) (the "Second Decision" and, together with the First Decision, the 
"Decisions"), which dismissed count 3 in the Amended Complaint and denied Landowners' Motion 
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Reconsideration as to counts 1 and R., 61 
judgment for A&B and awarded A&B its costs as a matter of right. R., pp. 644-45. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
This Court is familiar with A&B, having previously described: 
A&B is a water irrigation district located in Jerome and Minidoka Counties. 
Originally developed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), 
the district is now maintained and operated by A&B. The district is divided 
into two units, "A" and "B", with the B unit irrigated by ground water 
pumped from the Eastern Snake River Plain Aquifer (ESPA). 
A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Aberdeen-Am. Falls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 748, 118 P.3d 
78, 80 (2005) (spacing of "A&B" modified). While only the ground water of Unit B was at issue 
in that case, see id., it is the fact that distinguishes Unit B and Unit A that is most operative here: 
while Unit Bis irrigated by ground water, Unit A is irrigated solely by surface water.3 R., p. 
248-49. Since the mid-1990s, Unit B has been facing difficulties associated with dropping water 
levels in the ESP A, requiring Unit B ( and thus, A&B as a whole) to look for other sources to 
supply water to the water users in Unit B. R., pp. 252, 254-55. 
Landowners own property in Unit A that has been irrigated with surface water, provided 
by A&B, for more than 50 years. R., p. 249. Unit A, in total, makes up about 18.5% of the area 
(and, also, the voting power) included in A&B. See R., p. 255. The other 81.5% of A&B is in 
Unit B. See R., p. 255. This disparity in voting power has created tension within A&B, and the 
There are now certain acres of Unit B irrigated with surface water, having been converted (i.e., the required 
infrastructure being completed) in the mid-1990s. R., p. 252. Originally, all of Unit B was solely irrigated with 
ground water-that was the definitional separation between Unit A and Unit B. See R., pp. 249-50. However, 
for sake of ease, as used herein Unit A will describe the surface-water-reliant section of A&B (including 
Landowners' properties) and Unit B will describe the ground-water-reliant section of A&B. 
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course of history has shown that Unit as the larger unit, has been well-looked-after. R., 252-
53. 
In 2014, A&B undertook the "Unit A Pumping Plant #2 project" (the "Project"), which is 
primarily intended to benefit Unit B. R., p. 253. The Project included a second pumping station 
on the Snake River, along with an additional pipeline, to divert additional surface water from the 
river. R., p. 253. A&B claims this will improve deliveries to some 4,000 acres of Unit A (which 
does not include Landowners' properties), but is primarily intended to convert some 1,500 acres 
of Unit B from relying on ground water to using surface water-which those acres have never 
before been able to use. R., pp. 253-54. A&B has not acquired any additional water rights, but 
instead intends to use the same, already-existing surface water rights (which are already being used 
on Unit A) to irrigate both Unit A and these 1,500 additional acres. R., p. 254. 
Not only will less water be available for Landowners (particularly in years with below 
average surface water), but A&B voted to have all the district members, including Unit A and 
Landowners, pay for the Project's $7 million bond proportionate to their acreage. R., p. 254. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
A. Whether the District Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dan 
Temple and Deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
B. Whether the District Court erred in denying Plaintiff's Motion to Continue Proceedings or 
Deny Defendant's de facto Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Count 1 of Plaintiffs/Appellants' Amended 
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
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Whether the District dismissing Count 2 
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b )( 6). 
E. Whether the District Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Temple Affidavits. 
F. Whether the District Court erred in denying Plaintt(fs' Motion to Deny or Continue 
Proceedings on the Motion to Dismiss Count 3. 
G. Whether the District Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' ,\Iotionfor Reconsideration. 
H. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Count 3 of Plaintiffs/ Appellants' Amended 
Complaint pursuant to Rule I 2(b )( 6). 
III. ARGUMENT. 
Landowners' claims relate to two, separate property interests: Counts 1 and 3 ultimately 
seek to protect Landowners' interests in the water applied to beneficial use on Landowners' 
properties for decades based on the Idaho Constitution (Article XV, §§ 3, 4, and 5) and A&B's 
fiduciary duties to Landowners ( which, at a minimum, must include a duty not to reduce the 
amount of water available for Landowners' use); while Count 2 seeks to protect Landowners' 
interests in their property, based on their right to due process (Idaho Constitution, Article I, § 13). 
A&B' s position in this case has been that Landowners have no basis to protect their water 
in this action, because A&B contends it is currently providing the amount of water due to 
Landowners. A&B also argued that the prior judicial confirmation proceeding-where the court 
dismissed Landowners' constitutional claims relating to the Project's bond as beyond the scope of 
that proceeding-had a preclusive effect on this subsequent litigation of that issue. The District 
Court erred in accepting A&B's arguments. First, as to Landowners' interest in the water used on 
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properties, Landowners' rights were contractual, A&B' s argument would 
determinative; however, Landowners rights are not merely contractual. Landowners' rights and 
interests are protected by the Idaho Constitution and the fiduciary duties they are owed by A&B-
which protect more than just the delivery of three acre-feet of water per acre in an irrigation season. 
Second, the court that conducted the judicial confirmation proceeding was correct that 
Landowners' constitutional claims were outside the scope of that proceeding and, as a result, the 
prior proceeding is not preclusive of those claims in this case. 
This case proceeded in an unusual manner. A&B never filed an answer. A&B never 
engaged in any discovery with Landowners. Instead, A&B' s first action was to file a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) along with almost 200 pages of affidavit material with the intention 
of dismissing Landowners' claims under the summary judgment standard without engaging in 
the ordinary proceedings leading up to summary judgment. This was a deliberate, calculated, 
strategic decision made by A&B as evidenced by the content of the Motions to Dismiss. This 
procedural tactic is at odds with the purpose of "secur[ing] the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of [this] action." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l(a) (2015).4 While this Court has 
only addressed such an issue in the context of different claims, the Court's wisdom applies with 
equal force here: 
4 
[A]s a general proposition a motion for summary judgment would be better 
made in a quiet title action only after the defendant has answered and the 
issues are framed. Here the defendant, without answering, sought the 
dismissal of the action on the bar of the statute of limitations. While Rule 
12(b) provides that certain defenses therein set forth may be raised by motion 
The rules herein are cited and quoted as they existed at the time the motions were argued to the District Court. 
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to dismiss ... [y ]et here we have parties attempting to try on affidavits 
unpleaded of laches, which defense ordinarily requires a 
thorough presentation of all the relevant facts and is a factual determination. 
Osterloh v. State, 100 Idaho 702,703,604 P.2d 716, 717 (1979) (citations omitted). Likewise, 
Landowners submit that a motion for summary judgment ( especially one supported by almost 200 
pages of affidavit material) would be better made in this kind of constitutional claim only after 
A&B has answered (and engaged in discovery) and the issues are framed. A&B obviously believes 
that the facts of this case are determinative, or A&B would not have filed almost 200 pages of 
affidavit material. If facts are to decide a case (i.e., at summary judgment), the normal procedure 
for arriving at summary judgment should be followed, as the Osterloh Court wisely directed. 
Landowners presented their defenses to A&B' s Motions to Dismiss in a very specific, 
procedurally-mandated order and-although this proper analysis was ignored by the District 
Court-will continue to present their defenses in the order required by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. However, since justiciability goes to the District Court's jurisdiction, it must be 
considered first. With jurisdiction determined, this Court should find that the District Court should 
have struck the Temple Affidavits and then, under the proper 12(b) standard, denied the Motions to 
Dismiss. If consideration of the Temple Affidavits was permissible, the District Court should have 
continued the proceedings, per Rule 56(f), to allow Landowners to discover relevant facts. 
Alternatively, under the summary judgment standard, this Court should also deny the ,Motions to 
Dismiss. Finally, even as it exists (without discovery), the record in this case demonstrates that it 
would be appropriate to enter summary judgment on Landowners' behalf. 
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A. Landowners claims in Count 1 and Count 3 are justiciable, in that the claims are ripe for 
adjudication and Landowners have standing to bring them. 
As an initial matter, justiciability was not properly before the District Court. The },,1otions 
to Dismiss, like every motion, must "state with particularity the grounds therefor." Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 7(b)(l); Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632,640,339 P.3d 357, 
365 (2014) ("Where wholly new arguments in support of a motion are offered in a reply 
memorandum, the motion itself does not state with particularity the grounds for granting the 
motion"). A&B's Motions to Dismiss are both very clearly made under Rule 12(b)(6). R., pp. 38, 
366. Rule l 2(b )( 6) provides for dismissal of a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(6). 
However, all of the sub-categories of justiciability (including standing and ripeness) go to 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. IA C.J.S. Actions§ 74; see also Bettwieser v. New 
York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 326, 297 P.3d 1134, 1143 (2013) (a district court's 
"jurisdiction [to enter a declaratory judgment] is limited to cases where an actual or justiciable 
controversy exists" (quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added)). For that reason, the 
appropriate motion to raise justiciability is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule l 2(b )( 1 ). Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure I2(b)(l) (allowing a motion to dismiss for a "lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter"). To read Rule 12(b)(6) to include issues of justiciability would be to make Rule 
l 2(b )( 1) superfluous, which this Court refuses to do. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 
892, 900, 188 P .3d 834, 842 (2008) ("We have, in the past, applied rules of statutory construction 
in the interpretation of our rules of civil procedure. In matters of construction, this Court prefers 
an interpretation that gives meaning to every word, clause, and sentence" (citations omitted)). 
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while prior cases have considered issues of justiciability, see, e.g., ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical 
Access Grp., Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 331 P.3d 523 (2014), this case provides an opportunity for the 
Court to reaffirm the existence of Rule 12(b )( 1) and its distinction from Rule 12(b )( 6). By failing 
to file either of the Motions to Dismiss, based onjusticiability, under Rule 12(b)(l), A&B did not 
"state with particularity the grounds" for their motions. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b )(1 ). 
Further, considered substantively, Counts 1 and 3 present justiciable claims, that are ripe 
for adjudication and that Landowners have standing to bring. The District Court concluded that 
"absent a showing of an actual deprivation of water, which is not alleged in the [Landowners]' 
Complaint, [] there is no justiciable controversy and [the] allegations of the [Landowners]' 
Complaint are not ripe for judicial review and the [Landowners] lack standing to assert such a 
claim at this time." R., pp. 380-81. On that basis, the District Court dismissed Count 1. R., p. 
381. Similarly, the District Court dismissed Count 3, finding that, as a factual matter (drawn from 
outside the pleadings), "[i]t is clear from this record that the [Landowners] are receiving the water 
they are entitled to" and that "any injury sustained or to be sustained by the [Landowners] 
stemming from their allegations of misconduct or any alleged breach are, at this point, 
hypothetical." R., p. 623. The District Court erred in reaching these conclusions. 
Count 1 sought a declaratory judgment validating Landowners' constitutional rights to the 
water distributed to them by A&B and applied to beneficial use on Landowners' properties for 
decades. R., pp. 257,261. The District Court was empowered "to declare rights, status, and other 
legal relations" of parties, and the "declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and 
effect." Idaho Code§ 10-1201. Count 3 asked the District Court to enjoin A&B "from taking 
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breach its fiduciary duty owed Landowners, such as using water that would 
otherwise accrue to Landowners' future benefit. R., p. 260; see also R., p. 261. Frequently, the 
request for a declaratory judgment also seeks an injunction to effectuate the court's declaration. 
Several cases demonstrate that the justiciability (ripeness and standing) analysis is the same for 
these types of claims. See, e.g., Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 128 Idaho 371, 374, 
913 P.2d 1141, 1144 (1996); Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 770, 133 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006). 
l . Landowners' Counts 1 and 3 are ripe for adjudication. 
"Ripeness asks whether a court action is necessary at the present time." Schneider, 142 
Idaho at 773, 133 P.3d at 1238 (citation omitted). A ripe controversy, therefore, "must be definite 
and concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests .... It must 
be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of conclusive 
character." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted, ellipsis in original). In other words: 
"Generally, in determining whether to grant a declaratory judgment, the 
criteria is whether it will clarify and settle the legal relations at issue, 
and whether such declaration will afford a leave from uncertainty and 
controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Miles [v. Idaho Power Co.], 
116 Idaho [635,] 642, 778 P.2d [757] 764 (quoting Sweeney v. American 
Natl. Bank, 62 Idaho 544, 115 P .2d 109 ( 1941) ). If deferring the 
adjudication "would add nothing material to the legal issues presented" 
so that a court will be in no better position in the future and if a 
declaration of the rights of parties will "certainly afford a relief from 
uncertainty and controversy in the future" the case may be presently 
ripe for adjudication. Id. 
Schneider, 142 Idaho at 773, 133 P.3d at 1238 (emphasis added). "Thus, a litigant ... must 
demonstrate that an actual controversy exists and that the requested relief will provide actual relief, 
not merely potential relief." Bettwieser, 154 Idaho at 326-27 297 P.3d at 1143-44. 
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traditional ripeness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff to prove l) that the case 
presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that 
there is a present need for adjudication." ABC Agra, 156 Idaho at 783,331 P.3d at 525. However, 
ripeness does not require evidence of a past in.iury, see id., because declaratory judgment and 
injunctive actions "may invoke either remedial or preventative relief; it may relate to a right 
that has either been breached or is only yet in dispute or a status undisturbed but threatened 
or endangered." Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P .3d 700, 705 (2011) 
( emphasis added). Thus, "[ e ]ven when there is no immediately apparent damage, claims may be 
ripe for adjudication." ABC Agra, 156 Idaho at 785,331 P.3d at 527. 
In Schneider, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment determining the scope of an 
easement and his rights thereunder to enjoin the servient estate to remove certain obstructions. 
Schneider, 142 Idaho at 770, 133 P.3d at 1235. Plaintiff described "a specific future injury" that 
was sufficiently ripe for adjudication because he intended to subdivide his property at some point 
in the future, although he had not yet even applied to re-zone his property or submitted a 
subdivision plat. Id. at 773, 133 P.3d at 1238. This Court explained, "[d]elaying the adjudication 
would add nothing material to the litigation and a court would be in no better position to decide 
the existence of the easement." Id. Further, a "declaration regarding the existence of the easement 
will afford both [parties] relief from uncertainty and controversy in the future." Id. Thus, even 
though the declaratory judgment action would not specifically require the servient estate to remove 
the obstructions, it would specify the rights each party enjoyed and the sought-after injunction 
would then enforce those rights. Id. 
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Miles, the district court erred holding that plaintiffs claims were unripe. 
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 642-43, 778 P.2d 757, 764-65 (1989). This Court took a 
somewhat practical approach, explaining: 
Deferring adjudication would add nothing material to the resolution of 
the legal issues presented ... [i]t is clear that this issue will be before us 
either now or in the future, and a declaration now of the various rights of 
the parties will certainly afford a relief from uncertainty and controversy in 
the future. Since we are persuaded that we will be in no better position 
than we are now to decide this question, we hold that it is presently ripe 
for adjudication. 
Miles, 116 Idaho at 643, 778 P.2d at 765 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis 
added). Thus, because delaying would add nothing material to the record, this Court addressed 
the merits of plaintiffs claim. Id. 
Likewise, in Boundary Backpackers, plaintiffs challenged a county ordinance that imposed 
the county's land use policy plan on all federal and state agencies, claiming it threatened their 
interests and sought to enjoin the county from enforcing the ordinance. Boundary Backpackers, 
128 Idaho at 374, 913 P.2d at 1144. The county claimed that the dispute was not yet ripe, because 
plaintiffs were not (yet) affected, since no agency had changed any practice to comply with the 
ordinance and the county had submitted an affidavit from members of its board of commissioners, 
stating that the county did not intend to enforce the ordinance. Id at 376, 913 P.2d at 1146. 
However, this Court held that the issue was ripe, since "the ordinance threatens to disturb the status 
and management of federal and state public lands in Boundary County. The issues are definite and 
concrete and there is a real and substantial controversy." Id. As this Court later summarized, 
"although the plaintiff had not yet suffered the harm, a controversy presently existed and so the 
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was Agra, 156 Idaho at 785, 1 P.3d at 
On the other hand, in ABC Agra, the piaintiff sought a declaratory judgment merely 
because it was "no longer sure what [the defendant] will do with its property." ABC Agra, 156 
Idaho at 784, 331 P.3d at 526. In fact, there was nothing to "establish disagreement as to the 
[potentially disputed] covenant's validity." Id at 785, 331 P.3d at 527. Thus, because plaintiff 
"simply allege[d] that [defendant] likely disagrees with its interpretation of the restrictive covenant 
and this disagreement may affect its ability to market [plaintiffs] other properties," there was no 
"clear conflict" or "clear dispute" to adjudicate. Id. ( emphasis added). As a result, those "facts 
were too hypothetical and contingent to establish a justiciable controversy." Id. at 786, 331 P.3d 
at 528. As noted in the special concurrence, the defendant's ambiguous letter is concerning for 
plaintiff, but does not "create a real and substantial controversy justifying a declaratory judgment 
action"-but additional facts would develop in the future that would allow a trial court to better 
adjudicate the parties' rights. Id. at 786, 331 P.3d at 528 (J. Jones, J., specially concurring). 
Here, Counts 1 and 3 are ripe for adjudication. Certain relevant facts are presented in the 
Amended Complaint and were never controverted by A&B-therefore, under either the 12(b) or 
summary judgment standard, they must be considered true. First, A&B appropriates water and 
distributes it as those terms are used in Art. XV of the Idaho Constitution. R., p. 257. Second, 
Landowners are distributees of A&B, with the rights specified in Art. XV of the Idaho 
Constitution. R., p. 257. The water distributed by A&B to Landowners' properties "for decades 
has become dedicated to the [p ]roperties by application thereon to beneficial use . . . and are, 
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therefore water rights appurtenant to the [Landowners' p]roperties. R., p. 5 Landowners 
"have not consented to any decrease in the amount of water provided to the [Lando~ners' 
p ]roperties." R., p. 257 ( emphasis added). "The Project, as presently constituted, will cause the 
amount of water available to [Landowners], and other Unit A members, to decrease." R., p. 257 
(emphasis added). Landowners never claim that A&B has already denied them water. On the 
other hand, A&B is infringing on Landowners' rights to the water dedicated to their lands and 
protected by their constitutional status as distributees-and to make matters worse, A&B ( and the 
District Court) does not even think that Landowners have any constitutional protections for their 
water. Further, A&B owes Landowners certain fiduciary duties. At a minimum, these fiduciary 
duties must include a duty not to reduce the amount of water available for Landowners' future use 
without their consent, or else the imposition of these duties would be practically useless. A&B's 
actions, which Landowners allege, without disputation, "will cause the amount of water 
available to [Landowners], and other Unit A members, to decrease" must violate A&B 's fiduciary 
duties to Landowners. R., p. 257 ( emphasis added). These are the conflicts and controversies in 
this case. And these claims are ripe for adjudication. 
First, this case presents definite and concrete issues. As in Miles, Landowners have not 
This also contains some legal conclusions, which the District Court was not obliged to accept. However, while 
the District Court attempted to distinguish Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 528, 381 P.2d 440 
(1963) (which efforts Landowners substantively disagree with) by over-narrowing Bradshaw to only apply in 
cases involving an annexation, R., p. 377, the District Court never made any attempt-nor can any such 
attempt be availing-to limit the application of Art. XV,§§ 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the Idaho Constitution to just 
annexations. A&B has not contested any of the facts in this allegation in its Motions to Dismiss, nor has A&B 
provided any argument addressing those constitutional provisions. Therefore, the factual allegations must be 
accepted as true (i.e., A&B has distributed water to Landowners' properties for decades, where it has been 
beneficially used) and, given the above-cited provisions of the Idaho Constitution, the alleged legal conclusions 
(i.e., water has thereby become dedicated and appurtenant to Landowners' properties) naturally flow therefrom. 
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already been deprived of their property-yet the issues are not hypothetical or academic. And just 
like in Schneider, where the court would have been in no better position to decide the existence of 
an easement had it waited for further actions (e.g., unauthorized self-help) to bring the issue to a 
head; here, a later court will be in no better position to determine what kind of right and 
enforcement ability Landowners have, based on either the Idaho Constitution or A&B' s fiduciary 
duties, after A&B has actually deprived Landowners of water than a court is now. "Deferring 
adjudication would add nothing material to the resolution of the legal issues presented." Miles, 
116 Idaho at 643, 778 P.2d at 765. One issue presented is the nature of Landowners' constitutional 
interest in the water distributed to them under Article XV, § 4 of the Idaho Constitution. R., p. 
257. Another issue is the nature and scope of A&B's fiduciary duties to Landowners. R., pp. 259-
60. The surface water A&B holds in trust is being or will be used to irrigate some 1,500 acres of 
Unit B. That is not speculative or uncertain, as in ABC Agra. Whether that reduction in storage 
water can be allocated to (or, in other words, whether the storage water can be taken from) 
Landowners without their consent, as A&B contends, is the concrete issue before this Court. In 
the words of the Amended Complaint, A&B's actions "will cause the amount of water available 
to [Landowners], and other Unit A members, to decrease." R., p. 257 (emphasis added). 
Landowners contend that this violates both the Idaho Constitution and A&B's fiduciary duties. 
Second, a real and substantial controversy exists in this case. While A&B has not described 
what it thinks Article XV, § 4 of the Idaho Constitution grants Landowners or how A&B's 
fiduciary duties protect Landowners, it is absolutely clear that A&B believes it may take surface 
water, that otherwise would accrue on Landowners' behalf, and use it on other lands (where surface 
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water has never before been used) without obtaining Landowners' consent. 1s not a 
hypothetical, abstract, imaginary, philosophical, or academic controversy. In Boundary 
Backpackers, the county submitted an affidavit stating that the county had no intent to enforce the 
challenged ordinance. Boundary Backpackers, 128 Idaho at 376, 913 P.2d at 1146. Nevertheless, 
"although the plaintiff had not yet suffered the harm, a controversy presently existed and so the 
claim was ripe for review." ABC Agra, 156 Idaho at 785, 331 P.3d at 527. This case presents 
facts much more definitive, and less speculative, than Boundary Backpackers. There, the county 
averred it had no intention of enforcing the offending ordinance; but here, the record demonstrates 
that A&B will move forward with the Project and will take surface water, as necessary, to irrigate 
1,500 new acres (never before irrigated with surface water) by using water to which Landowners 
would be proportionally entitled, but for the Project. 
Lastly, this case has a present need for adjudication. In Schneider, this Court explained a 
"declaration regarding the existence of the easement will afford both [parties] relief from 
uncertainty and controversy in the future." Schneider, 142 Idaho at 773, 133 P.3d at 1238. An 
easement right is a real property right, and so is an interest in water. See Idaho Code§ 55-101. 
Therefore, here, a declaration regarding the existence and nature of Landowners' constitutional 
property rights and A&B's fiduciary duties will afford both Landowners and A&B relief from 
uncertainty and ( at least some) controversy in the future. Thus, Counts 1 and 3 are ripe. 
2. Landowners have standing to assert Counts 1 and 3. 
"The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party 
wishes to have adjudicated." Schneider, 142 Idaho at 772, 133 P.3d at 1237 (quotation marks and 
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citation omitted). "While the doctrine is easily stated, it is imprecise and difficult in 
application." Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (citation omitted). "[T]o satisfy the case 
or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in 
fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed 
injury. Id ( citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 
2633, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)). However, what the District Court utterly failed to consider is that 
"[s]tanding may be predicated upon a threatened harm as well as a past iniury." Schneider, 
142 Idaho at 772, 133 P.3d at 1237 (citing Harris v. Cassia Cnty., 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 
988, 991 (1984)) (emphasis added); compare with R., pp. 377-78 (quoting Coalition for Agric. 's 
Future v. Canyon Cnty., 160 Idaho 142, 146,369 P.3d 920, 924 (2016)6). Thus, in Schneider, the 
plaintiff, seeking an adjudication of an easement to open the future possibility of subdividing and 
developing his land, had "standing to seek a declaratory judgment because he ha[ d] demonstrated 
a specific future injury." Schneider, 142 Idaho at 773, 133 P.3d at 1238 (emphasis added). As 
a result,"[ e ]ven where there is no immediately apparent damage," Landowners will have standing, 
as long as there is "sufficient immediacy and reality" in the specific future injury to warrant action. 
ABC Agra, 156 Idaho at 785,331 P.3d at 527. 
6 
The District Court held that Landowners lacked standing because they had not already been 
The District Court's quotation of Coalition for Agriculture's Future is mistaken because this case does not present 
citizens making a general claim against the government to ensure the government abides by the law. See Coalition 
for Agric. 's Future, 160 Idaho at 146-47, 369 P.3d at 924-25. Here, while A&B is a governmental entity, 
Landowners have a more tangible relationship than existed in Coalition for Agriculture's Future. Landowners 
receive water from A&B, and the amount of water available for A&B to satisfy that distribution is being depleted 
by the Project-meaning, specifically, that less water will be available to Landowners in the future. For that 
reason, this case is much more like Miles than it is like Coalition for Agriculture's Future. See Miles, 116 Idaho 
at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. 
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injured by the Project. R., pp. 380-81. This was error, applying the generalized grievance criterion 
from Coalition for Agriculture 's Future rather than the individualized harm criterion of Schneider 
and Miles. If every plaintiff had to wait until they were already injured before filing a lawsuit, 
then declaratory judgments, injunctions, and quiet title actions would be inherently legally 
deficient and valueless. LandO\vners are claiming individual constitutional rights to their water 
and individual rights to have fiduciary duties honored; both of which will imminently be infringed 
by A&B. See R., pp. 254,257, 259-60. This is a distinct and palpable injury to Landowners. The 
surface water that, but for the Project, would have been delivered to Landowners is instead being 
depleted and used to water lands that have never before been irrigated by surface water. See R., 
pp. 253-54. For that reason, Landowners have standing to bring this action now. 
B. The District Court erred in considering the Temple Affidavits. 
In relevant part, Rule 12(b) provided: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of 
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 2(b) (2015). The law in Idaho in this regard has long been that "it 
is apparent that pursuant to a l 2(b )( 6) motion, the court has the option to consider only the 
complaint or to consider the entire record. The difference is a test of law [ under what the Court 
cailed a 'true 12(b )( 6) motion'] as distinguished from a test of facts" under a de facto motion for 
summary judgment. Stewartv. Arrington Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526,531,446 P.2d 895,900 (1968) 
(internal citations omitted). As the question is whether the court "chooses to consider" matters 
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outside the pleadings, it appears that the matter is left to the court's discretion. See id. As this 
Court has explained: "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the 
issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal 
standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise ofreason." Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 
Idaho 540, 544, 328 P.3d 520, 524 (2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
First, it is unclear whether the District Court perceived this issue as one of discretion. For 
instance, in the Second Decision, the District Court refused to consider an untimely reply brief 
from A&B under the summary judgment timeline, yet stated "[s]ince [A&B] has provided facts 
outside the pleadings the motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary judgment." 
R., p. 614, n. 3 (emphasis added). Given the language of Rule 12(b), the motion to dismiss must 
be treated as a motion for summary judgment only if the District Court "chooses to consider" 
matters outside the pleadings. Stewart, 92 Idaho at 531, 446 P .2d at 900. 
Second, it was within the District Court's discretion to deny or grant the Motions to Strike 
and consider or not consider the Temple Affidavits. However, while the District Court said one 
thing, it did another. The District Court denied the request to strike (or not consider) the Temple 
Affidavits because, despite being relevant and appropriately presented, yet explained that the 
Temple Affidavits were "not essential or necessary for purposes of I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)." R., p. 375; 
see also R., p. 614, n. 2 ("For the same reasons expressed previously by the Court the motions to 
strike and/or continue are denied"). This implies that the District Court intended to evaluate 
Landowners' claims under Rule 12(b)(6). See R., pp. 381 ("defendant[']s Motion to Dismiss 
Count 1 ... pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED"); 384 (same relating to Count 2); 623 
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(granting the motion to dismiss "Count III" without mentioning Rule 12(b)(6)). However, the 
District Court nevertheless considered matters outside the pleadings; which pleadings only 
consisted of the Complaint and Amended Complaint. 
For example, the First Decision states, without citation, that A&B "consists of 
approximately 650 landowners and irrigates approximately 82,000 acres of farm ground." R., p. 
378. This fact is nowhere presented in Landowners' Amended Complaint (see R., pp. 246-62), nor 
were Landowners aware of these district-wide totals as it is not information of common 
knowledge. However, this information is provided in the first of the Temple Affidavits. R., p. 62 
("A&B operates two divisions within the irrigation project, Units A and B. ... Together, 
approximately 650 landowners within the two units irrigate approximately 82,000 acres"). There 
is nowhere else in the record for the District Court to have found this fact. 
Another example, relating to Count 2, occurred when the District Court explicitly took 
'judicial notice of Minidoka County Case No. CV-2014-189," the prior judicial confirmation 
proceeding relating to the Project's $7 million bond. R., p. 381, n. 6. In the Motion for 
Reconsideration, Landowners explicitly pointed out the error in taking judicial notice of another 
case file while considering a 12(b)(6) motion. R., pp. 402-405 (citing Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 
Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990); Taylor v. lvlcNichols, 149 Idaho 826,833,243 
P.3d 642, 649 (2010); Peterson v. Private Wilderness, LLC, 152 Idaho 691, 697, 273 P.3d 1284, 
1290 (2012)). Nevertheless, the District Court found "no legal or factual basis for this court to 
alter or change its prior decision" in this, or any other, regard. R., p. 624. In the Second Decision, 
considering Count 3, the District Court explicitly cited the Temple Affidavits. R., pp. 621-22 (A&B 
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"has provided evidence that establishes ... , citing exhibit E of the first of the Temple Affidavits). 
Simply, the District Court was not applying the correct legal standards or even applying 
the standards stated by the District Court itself. As a result, the District Court abused its discretion. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's Decisions in this regard, refuse to consider the 
Temple Affidavits, and evaluate the Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b). 
C. Properly considered under Rule 12(b), Landowners' claims should not be dismissed. 
This Court has explained: 
When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
l 2(b )( 6), we apply the same standard of review we apply to a motion for 
summary judgment [that is, de nova]. After viewing all facts and inferences 
from the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether 
a claim for relief has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff 
will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claims. 
Coalition.for Agric. 's Future, 160 Idaho at 369 P.3d at 923 (emphasis added). 
The District Court was unclear about the 12(b )(6) standard, stating, for instance, that "[t]he 
standard for reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to I.R.C.P. I2(b)(6) 
is the same as the standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment." R., p. 372; see also R., 
p. 614 (incorporating this same standard in the Second Decision). However, this is incorrect. See, 
e.g., Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102,104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) (correcting a district 
judge who viewed a 12(b)(6) motion and summary judgment as the same by pointing out the 
differences) (quoted at R., p. 402). 
The District Court dismissed Counts 1 and 3, finding them not ripe for judicial review and 
that Landowners presently lack standing. R., pp. 381,623. Those arguments are addressed above. 
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Section III.A, supra. The District Court also dismissed Count "on the basis that the final 
judgment in Minidoka County Case No. CV-2014-189 is not subject to collateral attack and the 
claims of the [Landowners] are barred by the doctrine of res judicata." R., p. 384. Under the 
correct Rule 12(b) standard, none of Landowners' claims should be dismissed. 
l. Count 1 states a valid claim for relief, based on Landowners' constitutional rights to 
the surface water distributed to them by A&B. 
In Count 1, Landowners' alleged that A&B was an appropriator and distributor in 
accordance with Sections 1, 3, 4, and 5 of Article XV of the Idaho Constitution; that Landowners 
were distributees receiving surface water from A&B under those constitutional provisions; that the 
surface water distributed by A&B to Landowners over decades has become dedicated and 
appurtenant to Landowners' properties, as explained in Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift Irr. Dist., 85 
Idaho 528, 381 P.2d 440 (1963); as such, the Project undertaken by A&B, which will cause the 
amount of water available to Unit A to decrease, cannot deprive Landowners of the surface water 
appurtenant to their properties without Landowners' consent. R., pp. 255-57. 
The District Court dismissed Count 1, on the erroneous basis that it was unripe and 
Landowners lacked standing. See R., pp. 380-81.7 However, undergirding the District Court's 
dismissal of Count 1 is another erroneous premise: that, by virtue of being an irrigation district of 
The District Court acknowledged that A&B's first motion to dismiss, relating to Count I sought "to have this 
court dismiss Count I on the basis that the [Landowners] are alleging a claim of Inverse Condemnation and that 
[Landowners] have not alleged the essential elements of such a claim." R., p. 378 (citation omitted). In fact, that 
is the sole basis for A&B's motion to dismiss as to Count 1. See R., pp. 46-53. Landowners have not made a 
claim for Inverse Condemnation and are not seeking compensation for an illegal taking (which is done through a 
claim for Inverse Condemnation). R., pp. 271, 289. Because every motion must "state with particularity the 
grounds therefor," Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(l), that should have been enough to deny the motion under 
Rule 12(b) because the particularity provided in A&B's first motion to dismiss has absolutely no 
applicability to Count 1. 
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which Landowners are members, A&B cannot unconstitutionally take water from Landowners as 
long as Landowners get their three acre-feet per acre per year. See R., pp. 379-80 ("since an 
irrigation district and the distribution of water among its landowners is to be viewed as a whole or 
a unit within the irrigation district, the members of the district do have a right to all of the water of 
the district as a whole and it is only when there is a deficient supply of water do the rights of 
priority come into play"). This premise is incorrect for three reasons: (1) it fails to take into 
account the unusual and truly unique structure of A&B, (2) it grants A&B absolute discretion and 
fails to account for its position merely as a trustee holding water rights on behalf of its members, 
and (3) Landowners' rights (both constitutional rights and as beneficiaries of A&B's fiduciary 
duties) vest and are enforceable before there is an actual shortage of water. 
First, A&B is unlike any other irrigation district in Idaho. R., pp. 440-441. As noted by 
the Court, R., p. 378, the general setup of A&B is that Unit A is irrigated solely by surface and 
storage water, while Unit Bis irrigated solely by ground water (with some exceptions described at 
R., p. 252, and the effects of the Project, see R., pp. 253-54). The very name of A&B arises from 
and connotes this unique, bimodal structure. While the District Court distinguished Bradshaw on 
the basis of the annexation, separating "old lands" from "new lands" in that case, R., pp. 379-80, 
the distinct differences between Unit A and Unit B are more analogous to Bradshaw than the 
District Court was willing to concede. See R., pp. 440-441. 
The Bradshaw Court held that the "owners of the old lands, through and by means of the 
irrigation district, acquired, and for many years applied to the irrigation of their lands, valuable 
water rights, which had become appurtenant and dedication to their lands, and which were held in 
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trust district their use. at 546,381 at 450. The annexation, which precipitated 
the conflict in Bradshaw, had absolutely no bearing on that conclusion. See id. The exclusive 
dedication to the "old lands" was effected by the application to beneficial use upon those lands 
over the course of many years. Id. This exclusive dedication is what afforded the owners of the 
old lands their constitutional right such that "[t]hey could not thereafter, without their consent, be 
deprived of the use of that water when needed to irrigate their lands." Id. (citing Idaho 
Constitution, Art. XV,§ 4; Idaho Code§§ 42-101, 42-914). Thus, the fact of the annexation does 
not distinguish Bradshaw from this case. 
In Bradc;haw, water was appurtenant to old lands to which the owners of new lands, never 
before irrigated with that water, were making a claim ofright. See Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 538-39, 
381 P.2d at 445. This case presents water rights appurtenant (by its exclusive dedication) to Unit 
A lands, owned by Landowners, to which A&B, on behalf of the owners of some Unit B lands 
(which have never before been irrigated, and could never before have been irrigated, with surface 
water), is making a claim ofright. R., pp. 253-54. Simply, Bradshaw is on all fours with this case, 
and provides valuable precedential guidance that was erroneously ignored by the District Court. 
Second, A&B does not have absolute discretion, and should not be considered "as a 
whole," in distributing water. The District Court stated that the lands in A&B "must be considered 
as a whole" in the context of assessing costs. R., p. 383 (quoting Nelson v. Big Lost River 
Irrigation Dist., 148 Idaho 157,164,219 P.3d 804,811 (2009))(italics in original). However, the 
District Court erroneously imported that concept, without citation, into its analysis of Count 1 in 
order to support the faulty premise that A&B has absolute, unfettered discretion with regard to the 
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water it distributes, at least until there is a shortage of water. R., pp. 379-80 an irrigation 
district and the distribution of water among its landowners is to be viewed as a whole or a unit 
within the irrigation district, the members of the district do not have a right to all of the water of 
the district as a whole and it is only when there is a deficient supply of water do f sic] the rights of 
priority come into play").8 This is error because the consideration of an irrigation district "as a 
whole" only applies in the context of assessing costs and has never been applied by this Court to 
water distribution. See Nelson, 148 Idaho at 164, 219 P .3d at 811 ("all lands within an irrigation 
district available for and subject to irrigation ... must be considered as a whole, and [] the 
assessment shall be spread upon all the lands of the district which are or may be supplied with 
water by such district, under said system" (quoting Colburn v. Wilson, 24 Idaho 94, 132 P. 579, 
581 (1913)) (italics in original)). In fact, every case using the "considered as a whole" language 
applies it in the assessment context and never in the context of water distribution.9 Thus, the 
District Court quoted Nelson in dealing with Count 2, R., pp. 383-84, but could not cite any 
authority supporting the "considered as a whole" principle in the context of allocating water. R., 
pp. 379-80. Yet, this did not stop the District Court from erroneously applying this principle. 
9 
In a similar vein, the District Court held that an irrigation district member does not have a right to carryover 
storage water. R., p. 622 (citing Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 
878-80, 154 P.3d 433, 449-51 (2007)). However, the cited case and the reasonable carryover provisions of 
IDAPA 37.03.11.042 are specific to a conjunctive management situation associated with a delivery call. This 
case does not involve any action under the CM Rules; therefore, the District Court's reliance on these authorities 
is inapposite. 
See Nelson v. Big lost River Irrigation Dist., 148 Idaho 157, 164,219 P.3d 804, 811 (2009); Gedney v. Snake 
River Irr. Dist., 61 Idaho 605, I 04 P.2d 909 (1940); Brown v. Shupe, 40 Idaho 252, 233 P. 59, 61 (1924); Colburn 
v. Wilson, 24 Idaho 94, 132 P. 579, 581 (1913) (in each case, directing that the lands of an irrigation district must 
be "considered as a whole" in the context of assessments; but not applying that consideration to water 
distribution). 
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In reality, A&B holds legal title to real property (including water rights, Idaho Code§ 
101) and holds that property "in trust for" its member landowners. Idaho Code§ 43-316; see also 
US. v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 114, 157 P.3d 600, 608 (2007) ("Irrigation districts act 
as trustees for the landowners managing the water right"). While this trustee relationship (and the 
attendant fiduciary duties) are addressed in more detail in relation to Count 3, see Section III.C.3., 
infra, the fact that A&B does not hold full title to the water rights (natural flow, storage water, or 
ground water) outright helps clarify that A&B does not have unfettered discretion in distributing 
the water it holds in trust. A&B is a distributor of water within the meaning of the Idaho 
Constitution and, as such, its actions are circumscribed by Landowners' constitutional rights. 
Third and finally, the Idaho Constitution gives Landowners protected and enforceable 
rights when the water is dedicated to their lands, not just in times of shortage. Constitutional rights 
would be useless if they were ineffectual until a crisis. The Idaho Constitution provides: 
Whenever any waters have been, or shall be, appropriated or used for 
agricultural purposes, under a sale, rental, or distribution thereof, such 
sale, rental, or distribution shall be deemed an exclusive dedication to 
such use; and whenever such waters so dedicated shall have once been 
sold, rented or distributed to any person who has settled upon or 
improved land for agricultural purposes with the view of receiving the 
benefit of such water under such dedication, such person, his heirs, 
executors, administrators, successors, or assigns, shall not thereafter, 
without his consent, be deprived of the annual use of the same, when 
needed for domestic purposes, or to irrigate the land so settled upon or 
improved, upon payment therefor, and compliance with such equitable 
terms and conditions as to the quantity used and times of use, as may be 
prescribed by law. 
Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,§ 4 (emphasis added). There is nothing in this section of the Idaho 
Constitution is distinguishable based on an annexation, the existence of an irrigation district, or 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF-PAGE 27 
any other argument submitted by A&B or posited by the District Court. Landowners and their 
predecessors settled their properties in order to receive the benefits of surface water provided by 
A&B. R., pp. 248, 250. Landowners have used their water for irrigation purposes. R., pp. 257. 
It has been distributed to Landowners' properties by A&B for decades, R., pp. 248,257, which is 
"deemed an exclusive dedication to such use." Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,§ 4. These facts have 
not been contested by A&B. The inescapable conclusion of these uncontested facts is that each of 
the Landowners "shall not[], without his consent, be deprived of the annual use of the [water] ... 
to irrigate the[ir] land so settled upon or improved." Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,§ 4. Landowners 
have presented facts sufficient for Count 1 to survive A&B' s Motions to Dismiss under Rule l 2(b ). 
2. Count 2 states a valid claim for relief, based on Landowners' constitutional rights to 
due process. 
The District Court dismissed Count 2 "pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) ... on the basis that 
the final judgment in Minidoka County Case No. CV-2014-189 is not subject to collateral attack 
and the claims of the [Landowners] are barred by the doctrine of res judicata." R., p. 384 (italics 
added). To accomplish this, the District Court explicitly took "judicial notice of Minidoka County 
Case No CV-2014-189." R., p. 381, n. 6. 
As an initial matter, the District Court erred in dismissing Count 2 "pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b )( 6)" of the basis of res judicata and the nature of another case, which the District Court took 
judicial notice of. R., p. 384. Simply, by taking judicial notice of an underlying case-a matter 
outside the pleadings-the District Court was precluded from analyzing this issue under Rule 
12(b). Hellickson, 118 Idaho at 276, 796 P.2d at 153; Taylor, 149 Idaho at 833, 243 P.3d at 649; 
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Peterson, I Idaho at 697, at 1290. Despite this issue being the Motion 
Reconsideration, R., pp. 405-06, the District Court persisted in this error. R., p. 624. Thus, the 
consideration of res judicata is appropriately reserved for the discussion of Count 2 considered 
under the summary judgment standard. See Section III.E.2, infra. The standard under a true l 2(b) 
motion is whether Landowners have stated a valid claim for relief, which they have done. 
Irrigation districts have the power to levy assessments. However, "it has always recognized 
as a basic principle of the law that the assessments levied by virtue of its [ authority as an irrigation 
district] differ from a general tax levied for governmental purposes in the important particular that 
such assessments can only be levied upon the basis of benefits." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. v. 
Thrall, 39 Idaho 105,228 P. 236,248 (1924) (emphasis added). "The apportionment of cost to be 
assessed against the land in an irrigation district depends on benefits which have been previously 
adjudicated and determined." Hale v. McCammon Ditch Co., 72 Idaho 478,487,244 P.2d 151, 
156 (1951) ( emphasis added). 
In Bradshaw, the suit was not only about taking water from prior distributees, but also 
about requiring them to pay for the infrastructure to do so. Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 539, 381 P.2d 
at 445. There, the irrigation district also followed its bylaws and procedures to increase the levy 
on all of the members of the district. Id. However, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district 
was prevented from increasing the levy on the "old lands" for two reasons. First, the annexation 
document provided otherwise. Id. at 54 7-48, 381 P .2d at 451. Second, the Court explained that, 
additionally, "the imposition of such additional costs and burdens upon the owners of the old lands, 
without their consent, would be an invasion of their constitutionally protected property rights." Id. 
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at 548,381 P.2d at 451. (citing Idaho Constitution, Art. I, 13 and 14; other citations omitted). 
This case does not present the same annexation issue as Bradshaw. Thus, the first, 
contractual basis of the Bradshaw Court's decision is not present here. The District Court 
erroneously distinguished Bradshaw because of the first basis for the decision there. R., p. 383, n. 
8 (quoting Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 547-48, 381 P.2d at 451). The District Court erred by failing to 
consider the very next sentence of the Bradshaw decision: "Moreover, the imposition of such 
additional costs and burdens upon the owners of the old lands, without their consent, would 
be an invasion of their constitutionally protected property rights." Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 548, 
381 P.2d at 451 (citing Idaho Constitution, Art. I, §§ 13 and 14; additional citations omitted; 
emphasis added). The term "moreover"10 indicates that the constitutional protections cited provide 
another, independent basis for the same conclusion-that the irrigation district could not, without 
due process and just compensation, deprive landowners of their property to exclusively convey a 
benefit on others. Brad'ihaw, 85 Idaho at 547-48, 381 P.2d at 451. For this reason, Landowners 
have only ever asserted the second, constitutional basis for the Bradshaw Court's decision, based 
on Sections 13 and 14 of Article I of the Idaho Constitution, in Count 2. R., pp. 258-59. 
Landowners' basis for Count 2 is grounded in the constitutional language and in the second 
rationale of the Bradshaw decision in this regard. The Idaho Constitution protects Landowners 
from being "deprived of ... property without due process of law," Art. I,§ 13, and also requires 
that, in order to take property by eminent domain, a public entity (such as an irrigation district) 
10 Moreover means "in addition to what has been said; besides; further; also; used with conjunctive force." 
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 951 (5th ed. 2014). 
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must provide "just compensation," Art. I, § Bradshaw explained that levying an assessment 
for a purpose like the Project can violate the members' constitutional rights. Bradshaw, 85 Idaho 
at 548,381 P.2d at 451 (citing Idaho Constitution, Art. I,§§ 13 and 14, other citations omitted). 
While this case does not present an annexation precisely like Bradshaw, the differences 
between Unit A (which has historically used exclusively surface water) and Unit B (which has 
historically used exclusively ground water) are remarkably analogous. A&B is taking 
Landowners' property ( their money) without due process or just compensation in order to construct 
infrastructure that will provide a benefit to others and ultimately work toward Landowners' 
detriment. It is for that reason that the rationale of Bradshaw, together with the constitutional 
language of Sections 13 and 14 of Article I of the Idaho Constitution, provide a legal basis for 
Count 2 to survive a true 12(b) motion under the correct analysis. 
3. Count 3 states a valid claim for relief. based on the actions taken by A&B that will 
inevitably harm Landowners, violating A&B's fiduciary duties to Landowners. 
The District Court dismissed Count 3 on the bases of ripeness and Landowners' lack of 
standing; however, this conclusion was erroneous. See Section III.A., supra. However, even 
considered on its merits under a true 12(b) motion, Count 3 should not have been dismissed. 
A&B holds legal title to real property (including water rights, Idaho Code § 55-101) and 
holds that property "in trust for" its members. Idaho Code § 43-316; see also Pioneer Irr. Dist., 
144 Idaho at 114, 157 P .3d at 608 ("Irrigation districts act as trustees for the landowners managing 
the water right"). A&B is an intermediary between the State and A&B' s members. The State 
owns the water resources in Idaho and the water right authorizes its use. Idaho Code § 42-101. 
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The water right defines the rights of A&B ( on behalf its members) the State. A&B 
holds the water right (and other property) in trust for its members. Idaho Code § 43-316. This 
trust relationship delineates A&B's fiduciary duties vis-a-vis A&B's members-and it must 
respect the constitutional rights of its members, including Landowners. See Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 
115, 157 P.3d at 609 ("the entity that applies the water to beneficial use has a right that is more 
than a contractual right. The irrigation entities in this case act on behalf of those who have 
applied the water to beneficial use ... The irrigation districts hold an interest on behalf of the 
water users pursuant to state law" ( emphasis added)). 
As a result, A&B must act as "a prudent man dealing with the property of another" and, 
possessing "special skills" managing water and infrastructure, A&B must utilize those skills on 
behalf of all of the beneficiaries-including Landowners. See Idaho Code§ 15-7-302. While the 
existence of an irrigation district's fiduciary duties as trustee has been clearly stated, Pioneer Irr. 
Dist., 144 Idaho at 114, 157 P.3d at 608, and the Uniform Probate Code provides some guidance 
in this regard, Idaho Code § 15-7-302, the exact scope of A&B's fiduciary duty has never been 
expressly delineated. However, Landowners contend that, at a minimum, these fiduciary duties 
must include a duty not to reduce the amount of water available for Landowners' future use without 
their consent. Here, the amount of surface water for A&B's use is fixed and had been solely 
applied to Unit A for decades, yet A&B has increased the acreage on which this fixed supply will 
be applied--diluting the limited supply of water and decreasing the supply available to 
Landowners without their consent. This must violate the fiduciary duties A&B owes to 
Landowners as trustees of this surface water-a prudent person would not dilute a limited supply 
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of a finite resource that had been applied for decades for the benefit certain beneficiaries, even 
if that dilution would benefit other beneficiaries. Thus, Landowners have stated a valid claim for 
relief and Count 3 should not be dismissed under the 12(b) standard. 
D. The District Court abused its discretion by not continuing proceedings on A&B's Motions 
to Dismiss to require the filing of an answer and discovery in this case. 
"The decision to grant or deny a Rule 56(f) continuance is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court." Taylorv. AJA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552,572,261 P.3d 829,849 (2011) (citation 
omitted). The denial of a continuance "will be upheld if the court recognized it had the discretion 
to deny the motion, articulated the reasons for so doing and exercised reason in making the 
decision." Fagen, Inc. v. Lava Beds Wind Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 628, 633, 364 P.3d 1193, 1198 
(2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The District Court held that Landowners' claims "present solely constitutional questions 
which are questions of law for this court. The real issue for the court is whether the allegations as 
contained in the [Amended Complaint] present a justiciable controversy. For this reason the 
motion to continue is DENIED." R., p. 374; see also R., p. 614, n. 2. In reaching this decision, 
the District Court recited the correct standard from Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), but then 
erroneously found that Landowners had "not made a showing that they are unable to present 
specific facts to support their opposition to the [Motions to Dismiss]. They merely assert that they 
should be entitled to discovery before the motion is heard by the [District] Court." R., p. 374. 
While the District Court perceived this issue as discretionary and articulated some reasons ( which 
are themselves erroneous, see Section III.A., supra); the District Court did not exercise reason or 
apply the correct standards in reaching its conclusion-which constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
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A motion for summary judgment "contemplates the existence of an adequate record and it 
follows that a party opposing summary judgment must be afforded an adequate opportunity to 
conduct discovery to make that record." Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 
Idaho 99,104,294 P.3d 1111, 1116 (2013). Overall, "ftlhe purpose of Rule 56(f) is to ensure that 
the non-moving party has adequate time to conduct necessary discovery." Id. at 105, 294 P.3d at 
1117. Rule 56(f) provided: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [ for 
summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may 
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) (2015). The moving party must "affirmatively demonstrate[e] 
why [they] cannot respond to a movant's affidavits ... and how postponement of a ruling on the 
motion will enable [them], by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the 
absence of a genuine issue of fact." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 23 3, 23 9, 108 P .3d 
380, 386 (2005) (citation omitted, ellipses in original). By affidavit, the moving party must bear 
"the burden of setting out what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify their 
opposition, making clear what information is sought and how it would preclude summary 
judgment." Boise Mode, 154 Idaho at 104,294 P.3d at 1116 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Further, "[i]n ruling on a motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f), the trial count can 
consider the moving party's previous lack of diligence in pursuing discovery." Fagen, 159 Idaho 
at 632, 364 P.3d at i 197 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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the District Court's primary error was not even engaging in the analysis required by 
Rule 56(f). The District Court did not even attempt to cite, address, analyze, or otherwise even 
acknowledge the affidavits submitted with Landowners' Motions to Continue. See R., pp. 373-74. 
Those affidavits are the primary consideration and requirement of Rule 56(f). See Boise Mode, 
154 Idaho at 104, 294 P .3d at 1116. It is also impossible to say that Landowners were dilatory in 
pursuing discovery, since Landowners served discovery requests on A&B less than three weeks 
after A&B first appeared and before A&B had even filed an answer. See R., pp. 35,321. The two 
reasons proffered by the District Court are also unavailing and insufficient. 
First, the District Court explained that Landowners' claims "present solely constitutional 
questions which are questions of law for this court." R., p. 374. Constitutional questions 
frequently require the development of a factual record. It would be virtually impossible for a trial 
court to try to rule on a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress, a First Amendment free speech 
claim, or a Fifth Amendment takings claim without any developed facts. The constitutional nature 
of Landowners' claims does not negate the need to develop facts when facing a summary judgment 
motion. 
Second, the District Court stated that "[t]he real issue for the court is whether the 
allegations as contained in the [Amended Complaint] present a justiciable controversy." R., p. 374. 
This rationale can only apply to Counts l and 3, as these claims were dismissed on the basis of 
justiciability, while Count 2 was not. R., pp. 381, 623. Thus, this explanation cannot suffice as to 
Count 2. Yet, even aside from the errors in the District Court's justiciability analysis as to Counts 
1 and 3-see Section III.A., supra-the District Court relied on facts to determine that those claims 
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were not justiciable. large part, the District Court's justiciability analysis was swayed by 
consideration of the facts that A&B "provided evidence that establishes that the plaintiffs are in 
fact receiving the water that they are entitled to receive presently." R., p. 621. In that vein, the 
District Court stated that there was no "evidence submitted to establish the requisite requirement 
of threatened or immediate harm to justify any injunctive relief." R., p. 622. It is easy for the 
District Court to find that "the facts of the underlying action are not truly in dispute" when it 
prevents Landowners for conducting discovery sufficient to dispute the myriad facts presented by 
A&B in almost 200 pages of affidavit material. R., p. 374. 
The affidavits submitted by Landowners state reasons that facts essential to justify the 
Landowners' opposition to A&B's de facto summary judgment motion are not (yet) in 
Landowners' possession and describes what those facts are. See R., pp. 302-20, 439-90. The 
affidavits explain what Landowners expected to receive in discovery and how that would assist 
their opposition to A&B's Motions to Dismiss. See R., pp. 302-20, 439-90. As a result, had the 
District Court conducted the correct Rule 56(f) analysis, it should have granted Landowners' 
request for a continuance or denial of the Motions to Dismiss. 
E. Considered as a motion for summary judgment, A&B is not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law and, in fact, summary judgment should be granted in Landowners' favor. 
This Court has recently explained: 
Appellate review of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment is the same as that required of the district judge when ruling on 
the motion. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In making the determination, all 
facts are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
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~Murdock, 2016 Opinion No. 141, Idaho 385 P.3d 459, 464 (Dec. 2016) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is important to note that "[t]he moving party 
bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Aardema v. US. 
Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785,793,215 P.3d 505,513 (2009) (citation omitted). "Thus, it follows 
that if the moving party fails to challenge an element of the nonmovant's case, the initial 
burden place on the moving party has not been met and therefore does not shift to the 
nonmovant." Id. ( citation omitted, emphasis added). 
1. A&B is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Count 1 because A&B is 
diluting the water available to Landowners in violation of the Idaho Constitution. 
Under the summary judgment standard, there are genuine issues of material fact and A&B 
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Count 1. At the outset, Count 1 is explicitly 
based on the Idaho Constitution, Article XV, §§ 1, 3, 4, and 5. R., pp. 255-57. Neither A&B nor 
the District Court has ever challenged the applicability of these constitutional provisions. Thus, 
as an unchallenged element of Landowners' case, there is no burden on Landowners to prove 
anything-the Amended Complaint is sufficient. Aardema, 147 Idaho at 793,215 P.3d at 513. 
However, even with an under-developed factual record (made so by the District Court's 
refusal to permit the discovery process from moving forward), the application of the cited 
constitutional provisions is apparent. Once distributed water is dedicated to particular lands by its 
application to beneficial use thereon, that water cannot be taken from the property to which it is 
appurtenant without the landowner's consent. Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, § 4. Further, as 
between distributees, "priority in time shall give superiority of right to the use of such water. 
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Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, § 5. The supply of this water is also explicitly protected by this 
doctrine of priority, and can only be taken away with the landowner's consent-Idaho 
Constitution, Art. XV, §§ 4, 5. It is only the landowner's consent that can cede any part of the 
water supply to junior distributees; the self-serving votes of the majority of an irrigation district 
cannot take a senior distributee's dedicated water. 
Here, the unchallenged facts show that Landowners' properties have received surface water 
for decades, effectuating a dedication of that water to Landowners' properties. R., p. 257. The 
Project will now provide surface water to some 1,500 acres that have never before had the ability 
to be irrigated by surface water. R., p. 254. This will reduce the supply and the amount of water 
available for the irrigation of Landowners' properties. R., p. 254. 11 Landowners have not 
consented to any use of the water dedicated to use on their properties on any other location or for 
the benefit of junior distributees of A&B. R., p. 257. These facts are sufficient to show that A&B 
is not entitled to judgment and that, in fact, Landowners should be granted summary judgment. 
In addition to the unchallenged applicability of these constitutional provisions, Bradshaw 
shows the analysis of these constitutional provisions in a situation markedly analogous to this case. 
As discussed previously, A&B is called A&B because of its unique structure, encompassing to 
separate units that rely on two different water sources-Unit A is irrigated solely by surface and 
II While A&B disputes this fact or calls it speculative in its reply brief to the District Court, R., pp. 530-32, it is an 
"elementary principle of division: as the same number is divided by an increasingly larger divisor, the resulting 
quotient will correspondingly be continually smaller. Here, the same amount of surface and storage water is 
irrigating everything it was before, plus an additional 1,500 acres. [This has the effect of] diluting and reducing 
the amount of water available to [Landowners] (for their current use and for storage, at their option, against future 
years of shortage)." R., p. 547 (citations and emphasis omitted). The issue is not the "rate of delivery," which 
may or may not increase. R., p. 530. Rather, the issue is the overall amount of water available. 
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storage water, while Unit B is irrigated solely by ground water (with some exceptions described at 
R., p. and the effects of the Project, see R., pp. 253-54). See Section III.C. l ., supra. Bradshaw 
demonstrates how Idaho Constitution, Article XV,§§ 1, 3, 4, and 5 are applied in reality, and the 
parallels between the old/new lands in Bradshaw and Units A and B here are difficult to ignore. 
In Bradshaw, the conflict regarding water distribution arose between the owners of the "old 
lands" who had already been in the irrigation district and owners of the "new lands" who were 
recently annexed into the irrigation district. Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 539, 381 P.2d at 445. The 
surface water was dedicated to the old lands by its lengthy application to use there. Id. at 546,381 
P.2d at 450. This exclusive dedication, unrelated to the annexation, is what afforded the owners 
of the old lands their constitutional right such that "[t]hey could not thereafter, without their 
consent, be deprived of the use of that water when needed to irrigate their lands." Id. (citing Idaho 
Constitution, Art. XV,§ 4; Idaho Code§§ 42-101, 42-914). It was not just natural flows that were 
dedicated in this matter; storage water ( even though it was not all being immediately used for 
irrigation) was also dedicated and treated as appurtenant to the properties where it had ( or 
would be) applied to beneficial use. See Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 538-47, 381 P.2d at 444-50. 
Here, the surface water (including storage water) has been dedicated to Unit A lands, 
including Landowners' properties, by its uncontested distribution and application to beneficial use 
there over the course of decades. Bradshaw supports the conclusion that, as a result of that 
dedication, Landowners cannot now, without their consent, be deprived of this surface water 
(natural flows and storage water, including that stored for future use). As a result of Bradshaw 
and the text of Idaho Constitution, Count 1 should not be dismissed because A&B is not entitled 
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to judgment as a matter of law and there are genuine issues of material fact with A&B's arguments. 
2. A&B is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Count 2 because the prior 
Judicial Confirmation Proceeding has no preclusive effect and Bradshaw shows the 
due process concerns erroneously ignored by the District Court. 
After taking 'judicial notice of Minidoka County Case No CV-2014-189" (the "Judicial 
Confirmation Proceeding"), R., p. 381 (footnote 6 of the First Decision), the District Court 
dismissed Count 2 "on the basis that the final judgment in [the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding] 
is not subject to collateral attack and the claims of the [Landowners] are barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata." R., p. 384 (italics added). Because taking notice of the Judicial Confirmation 
Proceeding, which confirmed the Project's bond, requires consideration of matters outside the 
pleadings, this issue must be considered under the summary judgment standard. Hellickson, 118 
Idaho at 276, 796 P.2d at 153; Taylor, 149 Idaho at 833,243 P.3d at 649; Peterson, 152 Idaho at 
697,273 P.3d at 1290. Under this standard, Count 2 should not be dismissed. 
In this regard, this case is a simple illustration of the tyranny of the majority. It is 
interesting that A&B noted that "the landowners overwhelmingly approved [ A&B' s] right to enter 
into the loans by a margin of 81 % to 19%," R., p. 53 ( citation omitted), given that "Unit A covers 
only approximately 18.5% of the total acres under [ A&B], while Unit B covers the other 81.5%," 
R., p. 255, and the Project is overwhelmingly in the interest of Unit B landowners. The Project 
will make fewer acres dependent on the same ground water rights (Unit B) by making more acres 
dependent on the same surface and storage water rights (Unit A, with the additional 1,500 acres 
from Unit B). This will help Unit B's water supply problem. Yet, to make Landowners, who are 
part of Unit A, pay for the Project that will divest them of their perpetual right to the water 
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dedicated to their farms compounds the injury inflicted by A&B. 
Under the summary judgment standard, there is no basis in law to conclude that res judicata 
bars Count 2. In the final order of the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding, Judge Crabtree explicitly 
explained: 
In a proceeding for the judicial confirmation of an irrigation district's 
issuance of bonds, the court's focus is narrow; the court reviews the 
proceedings and determines whether the irrigation district's "assessment, 
list and apportionment are in any substantial matter erroneous or unjust." 
LC. § 43-408 (italics added). Notably, the court is not tasked with 
determining whether the projects sought to be funded by proposed bonds 
are erroneous or unjust. The applicable statutes do not require the court to 
... consider whether the intended projects may result in an unconstitutional 
taking or may adversely affect the property rights of private landowners. 
Therefore the [Landowners'] arguments regarding the potentially adverse 
effects of the Projects are not appropriate for consideration in the present 
bond confirmation proceeding under Idaho Code§§ 43-406 through 43-408. 
R., pp. 231-32 (italics in original) (the "Confirmation Order"). Landowners agree with the 
Confirmation Order, and the District Court erred in implicitly holding otherwise. This is not a 
final adjudication on the merits, and therefore is has no preclusive effect on Count 2. 
The District Court listed the elements of both "true res judicata ( claim preclusion) and 
collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)." R., p. 382 (italics in original). Yet the District Court 
provided absolutely no analysis of those elements as applied to this case-merely providing 
general citations to "long held" precedent, distinguishing Bradshaw, and restating the basis for the 
District's authority to apportion assessments. R., pp. 383-84. Nowhere did the District Court 
consider whether any of the elements of either aspect of res judicata apply from the underlying 
judicial confirmation case to bar any aspect of this case. See R., pp. 383-84. Doing so 
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demonstrates why Count 2 in fact, not barred by res judicata. 
As the District Court explained, "CoHateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue 
previously determined when: [among other elements] ... (3) the issue sought to be precluded 
was actually decided in the prior litigation; [ and] ( 4) there was a final judgment on the merits 
in the prior litigation." R., p. 382 (quoting Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 
81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012)) (emphasis omitted from original, bold emphasis added). The 
predicate for collateral estoppel to apply-that relitigation is sought of an issue previously 
determined-is not met. As a result, ab initio, collateral estoppel cannot bar Count 2. Further, the 
third and fourth elements of collateral estoppel are not present here. The issue raised by Count 2 
was not "actually decided in the prior litigation." The Confirmation Order stated that it was 
beyond the scope of the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding to address the constitutional arguments 
made by some of the Landowners in that case and refused to consider those arguments. See R., 
pp. 231-32. Therefore, there was no judgment on the merits of those arguments. See R., pp. 231-
32. As a result, collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) cannot bar Count 2. 
Similarly, under the doctrine of claim preclusion, "a claim is also precluded if it could 
have been brought in the previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: 
(1) the original action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the 
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same transaction or 
series of transactions as the original action." Berkshire Investments, 153 Idaho at 81,278 P.3d at 
951 (emphasis added); see also R., p. 382. Again, the predicate for claim preclusion (true res 
judicata) has not been met and this doctrine cannot bar Count 2. Landowners could not bring a 
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claim for declaratory judgment akin to Count 2 in the underlying Judicial Confirmation 
Proceeding. Further, the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding did not adjudge the merits of this claim. 
Thus, given the narrow scope of such bond confirmation proceedings, correctly described 
by Judge Crabtree in the Confirmation Order, Landowners could not have brought their claim 
for declaratory judgment (contained in Count 2) in the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding. Under 
Idaho Code § 43-406 (and as recognized in the Confirmation Order), the scope of bond 
confirmation proceedings is so narrow that it cannot accommodate the constitutional arguments 
raised by some Landowners there, let alone a counterclaim for declaratory judgment (like Count 
2) that would have transmogrified the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding into some unprecedented 
hybrid civil action. The District Court erred in finding (without briefing or argument on the issue) 
that, as a matter oflaw, Judge Crabtree was wrong. The Confirmation Order (and its conclusions) 
are valid and correct. Additionally, because Judge Crabtree declined to consider the constitutional 
arguments in the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding, there was no judgment on the merits of those 
arguments. For these reasons, true res judicata ( claim preclusion) also cannot bar Count 2. 
The District Court cited Thrall and Knowles, generally, for the proposition that "a final 
judgment entered in [judicial confirmation] proceedings is not subject to collateral attack." R., p. 
383 (citing Thrall, 39 Idaho 105,228 P. 236; Knowles v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 217, 101 
P. 81 (1908) overruling on other grounds recognized in Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 
Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004)). However, the rule is not that absolute. In Thrall, this Court 
explained that "a decree of confirmation is conclusive as to all matters embraced in the 
proceedings had, where no appeal has been taken therefrom, unless such decree is assailed by a 
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direct attack, or the statutory proceedings have not been taken in the manner prescribed by law." 
Thrall, 39 Idaho 105, 228 P. at 239 (emphasis added). As described, the Judicial Confirmation 
Proceeding never reached the merits of the constitutional arguments advanced there. In other 
words, those constitutional arguments were never "embraced in the proceedings had," and 
therefore provide a basis for a collateral attack. See Thrall, 39 Idaho 105, 228 P. at 239. 
Finally, despite its not supporting the basis for the Court's dismissal of Count 2, the Court 
considers some of the merits of Count 2. See R., pp. 383-84. However, considering the merits of 
Count 2 demonstrates that Landowners have stated a viable claim and A&B is not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
It is true that, as far as apportionment of assessments is concerned, A&B "must be 
considered as a whole." Decision, p. 15 ( citation and emphasis omitted). However, the collective 
interests of A&B cannot be a reason to trample the individual rights of any of A&B's members, 
including Landowners. This case is about more than dissatisfied members of an irrigation district 
challenging how much they are required to pay for a project. Right or wrong, A&B cannot decide 
that it is in the best interests of a majority of its members to violate the rights of the minority. 
Therefore, Landowners ask this Court to consider, protect, and declare their individual rights 
enshrined in Sections 13 and 14 of Article I of the Idaho Constitution. 
3. A&B is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Count 3 because A&B is 
diluting the water available to Landowners in violation of A&B's fiduciarv duties. 
Count 3 alleged that by undertaking the Project, which would injure Landowners by 
decreasing the amount of water available to them in the future, A&B had violated its fiduciary 
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duties as trustee of the water rights for the benefit of Landowners. R., 259-60. District 
Court dismissed Count 3 on the basis of justiciability. R., p. 623. As discussed above, this 
conclusion was erroneous. See Section III.A., supra. As that was the only basis for A&B's 
challenge to Count 3, R., pp. 389-91, Landowners are not required to put forth any evidence to 
rebut anything but A&B'sjusticiability challenge. Aardema, 147 Idaho at 793,215 P.3d at 513. 
However, to supply unchallenged facts (although their legal import is contested), A&B's 
breach of fiduciary duty arises from its actions, via the Project, that dilute the amount of water 
available for Landowners' use. R., p. 260. In short, A&B is choosing to help some beneficiaries 
(Unit B and the owners of the 1,500 acres undergoing "soft conversions" by the Project) to the 
detriment of others (Landowners and other Unit A members). As a trustee, A&B cannot choose 
to favor some beneficiaries and harm others because of the fiduciary duties owed to each and every 
beneficiary alike. The general rule for trustees is that: 
the trustee shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that 
would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another, 
and if the trustee has special skills or is named trustee on the basis of 
representations of special skills or expertise, he is under a duty to use those 
skills. 
Idaho Code§ 15-7-302. A&B must act in accordance with this standard of care and loyalty. This 
case presents an opportunity for this Court to delineate the scope of the fiduciary duties owed by 
irrigation districts to their members. In any event, Landowners contend that, at a minimum, these 
fiduciary duties must include a duty not to reduce the amount of water available for Landowners' 
future use without their consent. Here, the Project will dilute the limited supply of water, 
decreasing the supply available to LandO\vners. This must violate the fiduciary duties A&B owes 
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to Landowners as trustees of this surface water-a prudent person would not dilute a limited supply 
of a finite resource that had been applied for decades for the benefit of certain beneficiaries, even 
if that dilution would benefit other beneficiaries. A trustee cannot pick favorites to the detriment 
of other beneficiaries. Because it has done so, A&B is not entitled to summary judgment. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
The Project will make less of the surface water, which was used exclusively in Unit A for 
decades, available for Landowners. This violates Landowners' constitutional rights and is a breach 
of the fiduciary duties A&B owes Landowners. Requiring Landowners to pay for the Project is 
more than just salt in a wound, it violates Landowners' rights to due process and just compensation. 
The District Court's errors (applying incorrect standards, engaging in incorrect legal 
analyses, and abusing its discretion) have prejudiced Landowners. Rather than engage with the 
Idaho Constitution, the District Court expedited the dismissal of Landowners' claims-without 
even requiring an answer or any discovery. Finally, Landowners believe that the record is 
sufficiently developed (despite the lack of discovery), and the District Court's errors sufficiently 
numerous and egregious, that in addition to awarding Landowners their costs pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40, this Court may not only vacate and remand this matter; but that this Court can 
reverse the District Court and grant summary judgment in Landowners' favor. 
Dated this /~-A.aay of January, 2017. 
Robert L. Harris, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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